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  GRANT FARR,   JUL 10 2017
In 2014, China initiated a massive economic development project called One Belt One Road (OBOR). This initiative
involves China spending over $3 trillion during the next several decades on infrastructure investments in 68
countries. The goal is to recreate the old Silk Road, which flourished during the Han Dynasty in China between 207
BCE and 220 CE. This ancient Silk Road connected China with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe using caravan
routes through Central and South Asia. When completed this new Silk Road initiative will link China to Europe and
Africa using roads, railways, airports, fiber-optic connections, and seaports. The initiative will also develop major
industrial, agriculture, and energy centers in the participating countries, all linked to Chinese institutions (Economist,
2016).
One of the most important countries in this initiative, perhaps the most important, is Pakistan. Pakistan borders
China’s Xinjiang Province in the north, albeit at an elevation of over 15,000 feet. It therefore provides China with a
potential corridor through the Karakoram Highway to the seaport at Gwadar in Baluchistan on the Indian Ocean. The
Pakistan part of the larger project is referred to as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC. China plans to
spend at least $60 billion on infrastructure developments in Pakistan itself, although some of this money would be
loans to Pakistan, which Pakistan will be obligated to repay (Chaudhury, 2017).
CPEC will include the construction of industrial parks, agricultural farms, railways, airports, roads, a fiber-optic
network, energy-generating projects, including one of the world’s largest solar farms, and a high speed train between
Karachi and Peshawar that will travel over 160 km per hour. All of these projects will be built according to Chinese
plans, with Chinese labor, and connected to Chinese businesses. The project will also build a new
telecommunications network linking Pakistan with China, and through China to Europe. This telecommunications
connection will bring Chinese and Western culture, movies, and television to Pakistan (Economist, 2016).
CPEC also includes a number of initiatives in Pakistan that are not only of an economic nature, but projects that also
have cultural and civic implications. The Safe Cities initiative, for instance, is primarily designed to safeguard
Chinese workers from Pakistani terrorists, but it will also transform many of Pakistan’s cities. The Safe Cities project
includes building new safer buildings in urban centers, training local police and military on anti-terrorist and bomb
detection techniques, and the use of lighting and cameras to create safe zones in all Pakistani cities. The project has
already begun in Islamabad, but the city of greater concern is Peshawar, where the Pashtun population is particularly
militant and which is the center of the Taliban insurgency. Peshawar has experienced a number of terrorist attacks in
the past year. While this project will no doubt create safer cities, many are concerned that much of the traditional
areas of some of these historic cities will be destroyed to build newer, albeit safer, neighborhoods (Corr, 2017).
Some of the CPEC projects are already underway. Working on extending and improving the Karakoram highway has
begun and Chinese workers are now working on expanding the port in Gwadar. There will soon be over 15,000
Chinese workers in Pakistan. Although the road from the Chinese border to the port of Gwadar is not yet finished,
trucks are now travelling from Kashan, Xinjiang Province, China to Abbottabad in Pakistan. Other parts of the
project, including the Safe Cities project, are also already under way.
Problems?
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Pakistan’s political leaders are very high on the project.  Pakistan’s Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif visited China in April
of 2017 as part of a meeting of nations involved in OBOR. Economically CPEC may be beneficial for Pakistan,
although it will create a heavy debt burden for the country. Pakistani politicians have argued that the project will
“produce equal opportunities for all regions of Pakistan”. (Ahmad and Mi, 2017) Pakistani leaders have also argued
that CPEC will “improve Pakistan’s current economic development and create new business and job opportunities.”
They also added “that it will have an impact on the living standard of the common people and will address
grievances, sense of deprivation, discrimination and poor management of resources”(Ahmad and Mi, 2017).
CPEC will no doubt bring money to Pakistan, but it is not clear that it will “impact the standard of the common
people.” Given Pakistan’s level of corruption and a rigid class system in which most of the nation’s wealth goes to a
very small upper class, it is doubtful that much of the inflow of capital will help the “common people.” More likely
CPEC will enrich the already rich.
In addition, it is doubtful that this investment will create jobs in Pakistan, particularly meaningful jobs. The Chinese
will likely take most of the skilled and management positions. One just needs to look at other Chinese projects in
Africa, or even in Afghanistan. The Chinese bring in their own workers, technicians, managers, and security
personnel, and use very little local labor. More likely the jobs that will be created for the Pakistanis will be as janitors,
guards, or, at best, assembly workers. In the meantime, rich Pakistanis will grow wealthier by renting or selling land
and services to the project, and will expect to be compensated, read bribed, for their approval or sign-off.
Pakistan also presents has a number of social and economic problems that will create barriers for the ultimate
success of the project. Whether it benefits all Pakistanis will be the key issue. Pakistan lags behind other South
Asian countries in economic and social development. Except for Afghanistan, Pakistan is ranked the lowest among
South Asian countries, including India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, on issues such as women’s rights, literacy, public
health, and has the highest levels of social inequality (UNDP, 2016). In addition, Pakistan continues to be plagued
by high levels of corruption, an extremely hierarchical rural feudal class system, poor education facilities, regional,
ethnic, and tribal rivalries, and Islamic extremism.
The real question is, then, will CPEC help or hinder Pakistan moving forward. On the one hand the $60 billion
investment will bring resources to Pakistan. Pakistan can certainly use better roads and an up-dated and efficient
railway system, and the project may help modernize Pakistan’s traditional, outdated, and very inefficient agricultural
system. However, it is now becoming clear that CPEC is hindered by the very nature of Pakistani society, particularly
the provincial tensions and the lack of effective leadership in Islamabad. The Chinese governmental structure is
highly centralized with the power mostly in Beijing, while the Pakistani governmental structure is decentralized with
greater power and autonomy in the provinces. The two systems are struggling to work together and the Chinese are
already puzzled at Islamabad apparent inability to make and enforce decisions.
It is also likely that the project will create class anger and antagonism in Pakistan. Despite the presence of two very
large cities, Karachi and Lahore, Pakistan is largely a rural society in which 66 percent of the population lives in the
countryside. Most of the rural population lives in small villages as farmers or as indentured laborers on large
agricultural estates. There is growing unrest among these rural villagers over what they perceive as inequitable
treatment from Islamabad. This rural population is unlikely to receive much benefit from CPEC since most of the
investments are directed to the cities or to the wealthier areas.
Regional and Ethnic Divisions
One of the problems that is already facing CPEC is Pakistan’s regional and ethnic differences and conflicts. Created
in 1947 as the country for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan is in fact composed of several, not
always friendly, ethnic enclaves. Pakistan’s four provinces and two autonomous areas generally, but not perfectly,
represent these groups. These ethnic groups include the Punjabis, who make up about 45 percent of the national
population and dominate the national government; the Pashtun, a tribally based group who live in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Province and make up about 17 percent of Pakistan’s population; the Sindhis who live in large feudal
estates in Sindh Province including the city of Karachi, and makes up about 14 percent of the country’s population;
E-International Relations ISSN 2053-8626 Page 2/6
Pakistan’s Role in China’s One Belt One Road Initiative
Written by Grant Farr
the Baluch who live in the relatively poor areas of Baluchistan and make up less than 4 percent of Pakistan’s
population; and the Muhajirs, who are the descendants of the refugees who fled India in 1947 and who do not have a
province of their own, but reside in Karachi and areas around that city and make up about 8 percent of the country’s
population.  Other groups include the Kashmiris, the Brahuis, and the Saraikis from Multan.
Regional and ethnic rivalries and feuds have played a major role in Pakistan’s short history. For instance, although
the official language of Pakistan is Urdu, (and English), Urdu is only spoken as a native language by about 8 percent
of the population. Urdu, in fact, was the language spoken by the Muslims in the Indian Subcontinent, but not by the
people who lived in the area that is now Pakistan.
These ethnic and regional rivalries do not just represent differences in culture or language, but also represent bitter
rivalries for national political and economic dominance. This clash of cultures is particularly exhibited in the tension
between the military, dominated by the Pashtun, and the Punjabis who control the apparatus of the national
government. The military has stepped in several times since 1947, declaring martial law and replacing incompetent
and corrupt national governments.
Baluchistan, which is scheduled to play an important role in CPEC, is another province in ethnic turmoil. Baluchistan
is the largest province and has many natural resources. However, the Baluch have the lowest standard of living of
any ethnic group in Pakistan and feel alienated from the Pakistani power structure. Because of this, in part, a number
of militant Baluch separatist groups have formed and have been causing trouble.
The fear among many Pakistanis is that CPEC will only enrich the Punjabis (some have suggested that the “P” in
CPEC stands for Punjab), since the Punjabis control the national government, while leaving the rest of Pakistan
relatively poor (Shah, 2015). This is especially a concern of the Baluch and the Pashtun, who have already seen
many of the CPEC programs directed towards Punjab or Sindh Provinces, and away from their provinces. The
obvious case is the new highway being built as part of the initiative between Kashgar and Gwader. One of the routes
in the original plan, referred to as the Western Route, was to go through the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
However, the route was changed by Islamabad to avoid that province. The route is now planned to run largely
through the Punjab and Sindh provinces. True, a large section of the route will be through Baluchistan, but largely in
the remote areas of the southern section of the province, and will therefore not benefit Baluchistan much. Both the
provincial governments of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan have voted against the CPEC and have
petitioned the national government in Islamabad to include more projects in provinces other than the Punjab (Shah,
2017).
The fate of the project in Baluchistan is key to the ultimate success of CPEC since the use of the Port of Gwadar is
one of the project’s key elements. Increasing calls in Baluchistan for the creation of a separate state and ensuing
armed conflict pose an enormous challenge to the corridor. Baluch nationalists oppose the project, as it could
ultimately turn the demographic balance against them as other ethnic groups move into the province. Even at this
time the Baluch people only make up about 55 percent of the population of Baluchistan. This anger towards the
CPEC has increased to the point that Chinese citizens have been kidnapped and killed by Baluch militant groups.
On May 13th, 2017 gunmen killed 10 laborers working on the CPEC project in Gwadar. The attack was carried out
by the Baluch Liberations Army, BLA, a group reportedly fighting for an independent homeland for the Baluch. “This
conspiratorial plan, CPEC, is not acceptable to the Baluch people under any circumstances”, a spokesperson for the
groups reported (AlJazeera, 2017).
In addition, CPEC, and with it China’s cultural and economic incursion into Pakistan, is reminiscent to many of the
British Raj during which the Indian subcontinent was ruled by Britain from 1858 to 1947. While India functioned as a
quasi-independent country during this period, it was in fact ruled by London. British rule ended, in part, when
massive demonstrations and protest made governing untenable. China’s influence in Pakistan is not of the same
nature – China does not official claim to govern the country – but there are similarities and many in Pakistan have
noticed. While such massive demonstrations and protests are not anticipated, there will be considerable ethnic and
regional pushback against the projects.
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Militant Islam
Pakistan was created in 1947 as an avowedly Muslim country. As a result Islamic doctrines, laws, and institutions
have been a part of Pakistan since the beginning. However, although Islamic political parties have always been
active, in the last couple of decades, a new kind of Islamic militancy has emerged. These militant parties include
homegrown groups such as the Tehreek-e Taliban and the Lashkar-e Jhangvi, which are local or regionally based
organizations with specific agendas internal to Pakistan. One target of these groups is the religious minorities in
Pakistan, including the small Christian minority and the Shia Muslims whom they consider heretics and idol-
worshipers. These groups also strongly oppose foreign intervention, including by the Chinese, and will constitute a
challenge to CPEC.
Other militant Islamic groups are connected to or supported by trans-national Islamic movements. These include the
Lashkar-e Toiba and the Harkat-ul Mujahideen. Also, increasingly active in Pakistan are elements of the Islamic
State, al-Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban. These groups have carried out a number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan
including the bombing of a bus carrying government employees in Peshawar on March 17, 2017, killing 17 and
injuring at least 53. Of greater concern is the bomb blast outside a hospital in Quetta where lawyers had gathered to
morn the death of a prominent Shia lawyer. That bomb killed at least 70. In total, in 2016 Islamic militant groups
killed 380 Pakistani citizens.
Radical Islamic movements do not occur out of thin air, but are a result of deep dissatisfaction with the present
political and social malaise in Pakistan. In addition, many of these groups have the tacit support of the Pakistan
military. Some have called Pakistan a “failed state” (Khalid, 2017), since the government seems unable or unwilling
to curb the violence. But the disenchantment of many in Pakistan, especially young men, is a major reason for the
turn towards radical Islam. The lack of educational or economic opportunity causes young men to turn their anger
towards outsiders or minorities.
Militant Islamic movements can be traced back to the beginning of Pakistan, but the large increase occurred in the
1980’s when the United States and Saudi Arabia, among others, poured considerable amounts of money into
creating Madrasehs, Islamic schools, on the Afghan-Pakistan border. These religions schools were used largely to
recruit and train Afghan Mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. The Pakistani military
and the secretive and powerful Inter-Services Intelligence, the military intelligence agency of Pakistan, supported and
participated in this effort. However, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, these Islamic
insurgent groups turned against Pakistan itself.
The Pakistani military also finds the Islamic militant groups useful in several ways and is therefore reluctant to crack
down on them. For one, some of these groups have been used in the fight against India, Pakistan’s great enemy. By
supporting Islamic insurgents in Kashmir, for instance, the Pakistan military is able to keep up the fight against Indian
presence in Kashmir without being directly involved.
Militant Islamic groups in Pakistan are also a product of a profound and deep hatred of the West, especially, but not
only, the United States. In the eyes of some of the militant Islamic groups in Pakistan not only did the United States
invade Afghanistan and Iraq, but it also supports Israel, the great enemy of Islam. Also, Pakistanis have demanded
American aircraft and drones halt flying over Pakistani territory. Many Pakistanis, not just the militant groups, find the
incursion of drones and aircraft into their air space insulting and infuriating. In short, the Pakistani military, and to
some degree the Pakistani government as a whole, find the militant Islamic groups useful and are therefore reluctant
to crackdown on them.
These militant Islamic groups could be especially dangerous for the Chinese projects in Pakistan. China does not
have a good reputation in the Islamic world and has not shown tolerance for Muslim groups within China, especially
its treatment of the Uygur in Xinjiang province. Attacks on Chinese citizens in Pakistan have already taken place
and will continue. Although the Chinese are adept at creating safe places for their workers, there will be a continual
threat of violence against its citizens in Pakistan. In part the “safe cities” project is designed to keep Chinese workers
safe.
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Conclusion
Will CPEC be good for Pakistan? The Chinese initiative to invest billions of dollars in Pakistan may turn out to be a
good thing. It will certainly bring jobs and money to Pakistan and it will enrich some Pakistanis. However, Pakistan
has many problems that will challenge the success of the CPEC project, including regional and ethnic tensions and
rivalries, and the increasing activities of Islamic militant groups. Among the various challenges mentioned, the one
obstacle that may pose the greatest threat may be Pakistan’s highly hierarchical and corrupt class system. If
Pakistani’s feel that the project is only going to enrich those in power, the cooperation and buy-in of the country will
remain problematic.
However, China has done this before in other parts of the world, although not on this scale, and has worked with
governments more corrupt than Pakistan’s. This project’s success may depend on the ability of China to convince
the Pakistani people through their actions that they are neither a new version of the Raj, nor a superpower looking to
exploit the resources of a poor third-world country. If the project can truly create jobs and wealth for the average
Pakistani, CPEC will be a great success.  China will succeed.  Whether it benefits Pakistan remains a question.
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